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The paper re-examines the foundations of representation of in-
tertemporal preferences that satisfy intergenerational equity, and pro-
vides an axiomatic characterization of those social welfare relations,
which are representable by the utilitarian ordering, in ranking con-
sumption sequences which are eventually identical. A maximal point
of this ordering is characterized in a standard model of forest manage-
ment. Maximal paths are shown to converge over time to the forest
with the maximum sustained yield, thereby providing a theoretical ba-
sis for the tradition in forest management, which has emphasized the
goal of maximum sustained yield. Further, it is seen that a maximal
point coincides with the optimal point according to the well-known
overtaking criterion. This result indicates that the more restrictive
overtaking criterion is inessential for a study of forest management
under intergenerational equity, and provides a more satisfactory basis
for the standard forestry model.
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11 Introduction
In forestry management, there has been a tradition which claims that “the
goal of good policy is to have sustained forest yield, or even maximum sus-
tained yield somehow deﬁned” [Samuelson (1976, p.146)]. In an attempt to
understand this tradition, Mitra and Wan (1986) formulated the problem of
forest management as one of optimizing the sum of (undiscounted) utlities
from harvests of timber according to the well-known overtaking criterion.
Their formulation allowed forestry economics to be viewed as a particular
case of modern capital theory. Exploiting the optimization methods familiar
from this general theory, they were able to show that, when the utility func-
tion is strictly concave, starting from any initial forestry conﬁguration, the
optimally managed forest converges over time to the forest with the maxi-
mum sustained yield, which corresponds to the “golden-rule” of the forestry
model. This demonstration provided a theoretical basis for the tradition in
forestry management.
Over the last twenty ﬁve years, work on the general area of sustainable
development has brought about a thorough re-examination of the nature of
preferences over time relevant to studies on environmental economics and
the management of renewable resources. The Pareto eﬃciency principle is,
of course, an essential ingredient in such studies. And, the equal treatment
of all generations ﬁgures prominently in this literature, unlike other opti-
mal intertemporal allocation problems, where discounting future utilities is
common practice.1
These two guiding principles in the study of intertemporal preferences (of-
ten jointly referred to as the Suppes-Sen grading principle)2 do not, however,
take us far in terms of being able to develop useful qualitative properties of
the evolution of renewable resource stocks over time under appropriate man-
agement. In aggregating utilities of all generations, it is therefore common
practice to choose a more restrictive social welfare relation (SWR), and typ-
ically this SWR has been induced by some form of the overtaking criterion.
In this paper, I will re-examine the foundations of intertemporal prefer-
ences which respect intergenerational equity, propose a social welfare relation
1Ramsey (1928) had maintained that discounting one generation’s utility or income
vis-a-vis another’s to be “ethically indefensible”, and something that “arises merely from
the weakness of the imagination”.
2The Grading Principle is due to Suppes (1966). For a comprehensive analysis of it,
see Sen (1971).
2which is weaker (less restrictive) than the one induced by the overtaking cri-
terion, and provide an axiomatic basis for it. I will then apply this SWR to a
standard model of forestry and demonstrate the somewhat surprising result
that all the qualitative properties of optimally managed forests that one can
obtain by applying the more restrictive overtaking criterion can be obtained
with the application of the weaker and more acceptable SWR.
In proposing the new SWR, I would like to push the point of view that
in comparing inﬁnite consumption streams, it is only the comparisons of
consumption streams which are “eventually identical” that are truly non-
controversial.3 Consequently, I will put forward a set of axioms which are con-
sistent with this point of view. These axioms are Weak Pareto, Anonymity,
Completeness and Continuity for ﬁnite horizon comparisons, and Indepen-
dence. Of these the ﬁrst two have already been discussed above, except that
we postulate a weak version of Pareto, which restricts comparisons to con-
sumption streams which are eventually identical. The third axiom is natural:
since we are, after all, extending the theory from the ﬁnite-dimensional to
the inﬁnite-dimensional case, we cannot hope to weaken the postulates of the
standard ﬁnite-dimensional theory.4 In the intertemporal context, the fourth
axiom is common in utilitarian representations of preferences.
A noteworthy feature of our SWR is that it is axiomatized without pos-
t u l a t i n ga n yc o n t i n u i t yp r o p e r t yo nt h ep r e f e r e n c er e l a t i o ni nt h ei n ﬁ n i t e
dimensional space containing the set of consumption streams.5 In contrast,
axiomatic characterizations of the more restrictive SWR induced by the over-
taking criterion typically involve some form of a continuity axiom.6 Axioms
on the continuity of preferences in inﬁnite-dimensional spaces have been the
most controversial in the literature in this area, since the topology in which
such continuity is assumed determines to a large extent the nature of allow-
able preferences.7
3Such comparisons ﬁgure prominently in the theory of eﬃcient capital accumulation
of Malinvaud (1953), and in the theory of representation of intertemporal preferences of
Koopmans (1972).
4For the standard ﬁnite dimensional theory, see Debreu (1959), which in turn is based
on Debreu (1954).
5In this regard, the current work can be seen as a continuation of the study in Basu
and Mitra (2003a).
6The study by Brock (1970b) uses a “consistency axiom” which is actually a continuity
restriction on the underlying preferences. A more recent study by Asheim and Tungodden
(2004) also uses a similar continuity axiom.
7This is in contrast to postulating continuity properties on preferences in the ﬁnite-
3W ea p p l yo u rS W Rt or a n kc o n s u m p t i on streams generated by the model
of forestry used in Mitra and Wan(1986). We call a consumption stream
maximal if it is a maximal point in the feasible set in terms of the SWR, and
study properties of maximal paths. We ﬁnd that maximal paths converge
over time to the forest with the maximum sustained yield, which demon-
strates that the notion of maximality is enough to provide a theoretical basis
for the tradition in forest management, which has emphasized the goal of
maximum sustained yield. That is, in studying the long-run properties of
paths which are maximal and those which are optimal according to the fa-
miliar overtaking criterion, the latter concept does not possess any discernible
advantage.
U s i n gd u a l i t yt h e o r y ,w es h o wt h a tm a ximal paths have generalized in-
tertemporal proﬁt maximizing (bounded) shadow prices associated with them,
just like optimal paths do. So, one cannot have “errant behavior” on maxi-
mal paths, compared to optimal paths, in the short-run either. We combine
the above two ﬁndings to establish the result that the set of maximal paths
coincides exactly with the set of optimal paths. This leads us to conclude
that in the context of the forestry model, one can completely dispense with
the more restrictive overtaking criterion.
2N o t a t i o n
Let N denote the set of natural numbers {1,2,3,...}, and let R denote the
set of real numbers. Let L denote the closed interval [0,1] ⊂ R, let S denote
the set RN, and let C denote the set LN.Cis to be interpreted as the set of
consumption sequences. Thus, we write c ≡ (c1,c 2,...) ∈ C if and only if
ct ∈ [0,1] for all t ∈ N .
Given x ∈ S, and N ∈ N , let us denote by x(N) the vector consisting of
the ﬁrst N elements of x and by x[N] the sequence from term (N+1) onwards.
So, x(N)=( x1,x 2,...,x N) and x[N]=( xN+1,x N+2,...). Clearly, x[N] ∈ S.
We will denote the sequence (x1,x 2,...,x N,0,0,...) by (x(N),0[N]).
For c,c  ∈ C, we write c  ≥ c if c 
t ≥ ct for all t ∈ N ;a n d ,w ew r i t ec  >c
if c  ≥ c, and c   = c.
dimensional theory.
4For each n ∈ N, the sum-norm on Rn is deﬁned by:





The corresponding sum metric is deﬁned by:
d(x,y)=||x − y|| forx,y ∈ R
n
The unit vectors in Rn are denoted by e1,...,e n.
Denote by U the set of continuous functions u : L → R, such that u is
increasing on L, and u(0) = 0,u(1) = 1.
A social welfare relation (SWR) is a binary relation,  ,o nC ,w h i c hi s
reﬂexive and transitive (a pre-ordering).8 We associate with  its symmetric
and asymmetric components in the usual way. Thus, we write c ∼ c  when
c  c  and c   c both hold; and, we write c    c when c   c holds, but
c  c  does not hold.
AS W RA is a subrelation to a SWR B if (a) x,y ∈ X and x A y
implies x B y; and (b) x,y ∈ X and x  A y implies x  B y.
3 On a Utilitarian Social Welfare Relation9
In this section we will introduce the notion of a utilitarian social welfare
relation, and provide an axiomatic basis for it. The social welfare relation
will only compare consumption sequences which are “eventually identical”, so
that the relation will be “more incomplete” than the familiar SWR induced
by the overtaking criterion.10 It will be based consequently on axioms that
relate only to consumption sequences which are eventually identical, and
therefore will be more widely acceptable.
8In the economics literature, a pre-ordering is often refereed to as a “partial ordering”.
However, in the mathematics literature, the term “partial ordering” refers to a binary
relation which is transitive and antisymmetric. To avoid confusion, we use the mathe-
matical terminology, since the term “pre-order” is never used in any other sense in either
discipline. Incidentally, our usage coincides with the terminology introduced in Debreu
(1959).
9The results in this section are stated without proofs. They can be established along
the lines indicated in Mitra (2003).
10Our SWR will later be compared in detail with the one induced by the overtaking
criterion.
53.1 Axiomatic Characterization of a Utilitarian SWR
Deﬁnition 1 Given a utility function, u ∈ U, a utilitarian SWR correspond-
ing to u i sab i n a r yr e l a t i o nu, deﬁned by:
c u c











We ﬁnd the ranking of consumption sequences according to the utilitarian
SWR to be persuasive. Thus, one may consider getting together the members
of the ﬁnite society {1,...,N}, a n da s k i n gt h e mt or a n kc versus c . If they









In this case, it is legitimate for the inﬁnite horizon society to rank c above
c  because the inﬁnite number of future generations, who are not included in
the ﬁnite society {1,...,N}, are indiﬀerent between c and c . In other words,
in this situation, all future generations beyond N are willing to go along with
the (utilitarian) preferences of the ﬁnite society {1,...,N}.
The following example illustrates the nature of the utilitarian SWR:
Example 1
c =( 0 .2, 0, 0.1, 0.20 .1, 0.2, ...)
c  =( 0 , 0.1, 0.10 .2, 0.10 .2, ...)
 
Here the ﬁnite society {1,2} applying utilitarian principles to itself prefers
c to c . All future generations beyond time period 2 are indiﬀerent between
c and c . So, in this case, we would have c  u c , according to every utility
function u ∈ U.
We turn now to the set of axioms which characterize the utilitarian SWR.
To this end, let us ﬁrst consider the following two axioms, which are fairly
straightforward.
Axiom 1 (Weak Pareto) If c,c  ∈ C, and there exists N ∈ N, such that
c(N) >c  (N) and c[N]=c [N], then c   c .
6Axiom 2 (Anonymity) If c,c  are in C, and there exist r,s in N , such that
cr = c 
s and cs = c 
r , while ct = c 
t for all t ∈ N ,s u c ht h a tt  = r,s ,t h e n
c  ∼ c.
T h eﬁ r s ta x i o mi sw e a k e rt h a nt h es t a n d a r dPareto Rule,s i n c ei tp o s t u -
lates the Pareto pre-order only in comparisons of consumption sequences c
and c  which are eventually identical. The second axiom, which is sometimes
also called the Equity Axiom (see Svensson (1980)), embodies a minimal
equity principle in that it ensures equal treatment of the consumption of
generations over time in the preference structure.11
T h en e x ta x i o mi n c o r p o r a t e st h en o t i o nt h a tw h e nw ea r ed e a l i n gw i t h
“ﬁnite horizon intergenerational societies”, we have no diﬃculty in ranking
any two consumption sequences. In fact, the axiom makes preferences over
such consumption sequences as well-behaved as postulated in the standard
theory of numerical representation of preferences, following Debreu (1954,
1959).
In order to formally write this axiom, let us deﬁne, for each T ∈ N,
C(T)={c ∈ C : ct =0forallt∈ N,satisfying t > T}
Axiom 3 For each T ∈ N, the SWR  is a complete pre-order on C(T),
and it is continuous in the sum metric on C(T).
T h i sa x i o mc o m b i n e sA x i o m s1a n d2u s e db yB r o c k( 1 9 7 0 b )i nh i sa x -
iomatic characterization of the overtaking criterion. Note that assumptions
like completeness and continuity of the pre-order  on C(T) have been non-
controversial axioms in this literature. It is only when such assumptions are
made on the set C that one needs to discuss whether such a complete ranking
is always possible, and whether continuity in some topologies on C are more
acceptable than others.
Our ﬁnal axiom is a strong one, but its use is so prevalent in describing
intertemporal preferences that we shall have little to say about it, beyond
what is already known in the literature. It is the Independence Axiom,a n d
11Many authors have felt that a stronger notion than the Anonymity Axiom is needed to
reﬂect intergenerational equity in intertemporal preferences. However, there appears to be
general agreement that any notion of intergenerational equity in intertemporal preferences
must include the Anonymity Axiom. Since we are attempting an axiomatic characteriza-
tion of a utilitarian SWR, we feel justiﬁed in imposing this weak equity requirement on
the SWR.
7it follows the postulate, introduced by Debreu (1960) in the ﬁnite-horizon
context, and by Koopmans (1960) in an inﬁnite-horizon context, in their
studies on the representation of preferences by suitable utility functions.12
Axiom 4 (Independence) If c,c  ∈ C and N ∈ N satisfy:
(c(N),c[N])  (c
 (N),c[N]) (1)
then they must also satisfy:
(c(N),c
 [N])  (c
 (N),c
 [N]) (2)
Remark 1 (i) Loosely speaking, the independence axiom says that the pref-
erence between two consumption sequences is independent of those parts of
the two streams which are identical, whatever be the vector representing the
identical part.
(ii) The above independence axiom is similar to Postulate 3 in Koopmans
(1960) and to Postulate P3 in Koopmans, Diamond and Williamson (1964),
w h e r ei ti sr e f e r r e dt oa s“ L i m i t e dN o n c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y ” .
If a SWR  satisﬁes the above four axioms, then it is representable by
the utilitarian ordering, in comparisons of consumption sequences which are
“eventually identical.” To state this result formally, we need to introduce
the following notation.
Denote by D the subset of RN, consisting of sequences with at most a
ﬁnite number of non-zero entries. If c,c  ∈ C, then c and c  are said to be
eventually identical if (c − c ) ∈ D.
Theorem 1 Suppose a SWR  satisﬁes Axioms 1-4. Then, there is a utility
function, u ∈ U, such that for all c,c  ∈ C, satisfying (c − c ) ∈ D,
c  c





t)) ≥ 0 (3)
Further, the utility function u ∈ U satisfying (3) is unique.
12The independence postulate, developed by Debreu (1960) and Koopmans (1960), fol-
lows the pioneering work in this area by Leontief (1947a, 1947b) and Samuelson (1947).
8Remark 2 (i)Note that the sum in (3) is well-deﬁned since c 
t = ct for all
but a ﬁnite number of periods t ∈ N.
(ii) In the utilitarian representation of preferences in (3), the fact that
the same utility function can be used for all periods follows directly from the
Anonymity axiom; in fact, the utility function must be the same for all the
periods. The fact that the same utility function can be used regardless of how
many non-zero components there are in (c − c ) is a deeper result, involving
the Independence axiom in an essential way.
Theorem 1 can be used to provide the following axiomatic characteriza-
tion of the utilitarian SWR u.
Theorem 2 (i) Suppose there is a utility function, u ∈ U, for which the
corresponding utilitarian SWR u is a subrelation to a SWR  . Then 
satisﬁes Axioms 1-4.
(ii) Suppose a SWR  satisﬁes Axioms 1-4. Then, there is a utility func-
tion, u ∈ U, such that the corresponding utilitarian SWR uis a subrelation
to  .
3 . 2 C o m p a r i s o nw i t ht h eS W Rd e ﬁ n e db yt h eo v e r -
taking criterion
The standard method of comparing consumption sequences, while respecting
the equal treatment of all generations, is by employing the overtaking crite-
rion. The resulting pre-order is a generalization of the one used by Ramsey
(1928), and was proposed independently by Atsumi (1965) and von Weiz-
sacker (1965). It was subsequently generalized by Gale (1967), McKenzie
(1968) and Brock (1970a). We can formally deﬁne it in the following way.
Deﬁnition 2 Given a utility function, u ∈ U, a Ramsey-Atsumi-von Weiz-
sacker (RAV) social welfare relation corresponding to u is a binary relation
Ru, such that for c,c  ∈ C,
cRuc








t) forallN ≥ ¯ N
(R)
The symmetric and asymmetric components of Ru will be denoted by Iu and
Pu.
9Following Brock (1970b), one can obtain an axiomatic characterization
of the RAV social welfare relation in terms of Axioms 1-4 of the previous
section, and an additional consistency axiom13, which we now state.
Axiom 5 (Consistency) For c,c  ∈ C,
(a)If there isN
  ∈ N,such that (c(N),0[N])  (c
 (N),0[N]) forallN ≥ N




  ∈ N,such that (c(N),0[N])  (c
 (N),0[N]) forallN ≥ N
 ,with
(c(N),0[N])   (c
 (N),0[N]) holding for a subsequence of N ≥ N
 ,t h e nc  c
 
(4b)
Notice that, unlike Axioms 1-4, Axiom 5 does compare consumption se-
quences which are not eventually identical. Since such comparisons are based
on comparisons of consumption sequences which are eventually identical, one
might view Axiom 5 also as a continuity restriction on preferences.14
The characterization result15 can be stated as follows.
Theorem 3 (i)Suppose a SWR  satisﬁes Axioms 1-5. Then, there is a
utility function, u ∈ U, such that the RAV social welfare relation Ru, corre-
sponding to u, is a subrelation to  .
(ii) Suppose there is a utility function, u ∈ U, such that the RAV social
welfare relation Ru, corresponding to u, is a subrelation to a SWR  .Then,
 satisﬁes Axioms 1-5.
The crucial diﬀerence between the utilitarian social welfare relation and
the RAV social welfare relation is that the latter has to satisfy (in addition to
13According to Brock (1970), this axiom “captures the notion that decisions on inﬁnite
programs are consistent with decisions on ﬁnite programs of length n if n is large enough.”
14Asheim and Tungodden (2004) use an axiom which is similar, and which they view as
a continuity restriction.
15We present Brock’s characterization result in a form so that it may be readily be
compared with our results reported in the previous section. Actually, Brock does not
impose the Anonymity axiom, and therefore gets a sequence of utility functions (rather
than a single one) in his characterization result. He does note however that under an
Anonymity axiom, these utility functions would be the same. Brock also does not impose
the Pareto axiom, although, to apply the representation theorem of Debreu (1960), he
does assume that there are at least three factors of IN, which are essential in the sense of
Debreu (1960).
10Axioms 1-4) the consistency (or continuity) Axiom 5. This diﬀerence might
best be explained by looking at an example16 of two consumption sequences
where, because of Axiom 5, the RAV SWR can compare the two sequences,
but where the utilitarian SWR declares them non-comparable.
Example 2
c =1 /2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16, 1/32, 1/64, ...)
c  =3 /41 /8, 1/16, 1/32, 1/64, 1/128, ...)
 
Given the utility function u ∈ U, which satisﬁes u(c)=c, consider the
utilitarian SWR u and the RAV SWR Ru associated with it. We can verify








u(ct) forallT ≥ ¯ N
so that c  is preferred to c according to the RAV SWR, corresponding to u.
The question arises whether c  should be preferred to c by the inﬁnite
horizon society. This is not altogether clear. The problems with judging c 
to be better than c in such a case can be seen as follows.
If we look at any ﬁnite-horizon society, and ask the society to rank c
versus c , they will indeed rank c  higher than c, if they apply utilitarian
principles to themselves. However, no matter how large the ﬁnite horizon,
there are an inﬁnite number of future generations who rank c  below c; in
fact, all generations beyond the ﬁrst prefer c to c . Thus, it is never possible to
have consensus of opinion between any ﬁnite horizon society and the inﬁnite
number of future generations not included in that ﬁnite society. [This should
be compared with the “consensus” obtained when the utilitarian SWR can
be used to compare consumption sequences].
If one considers the inﬁnite horizon society, one sees that the (inﬁnite)
utility sum for both consumption sequences is precisely equal to 1, and so the
RAV SWR in fact violates the utilitarian principles on which it is supposed
to be based.
It appears to us that Axiom 5 is not as obvious an axiom to accept
as Axioms 1-4 in this context. In other words, we ﬁnd the RAV SWR less
16This example is based on the discussion in Basu and Mitra (2003b). The present form
of this example owes much to comments on the Basu-Mitra (2003b) paper by Wolfgang
Buchholz.
11persuasive than the utilitarian SWR. Nevertheless, almost all of the theory of
optimal intertemporal allocation, in which generations are treated equally in
its preference structure, uses the RAV SWR, and therefore accepts Axiom 5
(in addition to Axioms 1-4). The reason for this is that even though Axiom 5
is not an obvious axiom to accept, it gives suﬃcient structure to intertemporal
preferences so that the theory of optimal intertemporal allocation has some
predictive power: a path which is optimal according to this pre-ordering
in the typical intertemporal model is unique, and the nature of such an
optimal path can be described quite accurately, both in terms of short-run
characteristics (the Ramsey-Euler or competitive conditions), and long-run
behavior (the turnpike property).
The presumption appears to be that if we wanted to proceed with in-
tertemporal preferences satisfying only Axioms 1-4 (that is, without impos-
ing something like Axiom 5), one would not have a useful theory of optimal
behavior over time. In principle, there could be many maximal points ac-
cording to the utilitarian SWR, and it might be the case that their behavior
(as a group of paths) fails to have some unifying mode worth characteriz-
ing. Unfortunately, this issue has not been explored in the literature, and
therefore such misgivings about a theory based solely on the utilitarian SWR
m i g h tb ep r e m a t u r e . 17
We will establish the rather surprising result that in the standard forestry
model, a maximal point according to the utilitarian SWR is in fact unique
and coincides with the optimal point according to the RAV SWR.T h i ss h o w s
that we do not need the SWR induced by the overtaking criterion, and conse-
quently the comparisons entailed by Axiom 5, to present the theory of forest
management, respecting intergenerational equity. This puts the theory on a
more robust and satisfactory basis in terms of the postulated intertemporal
preference structure.
3.3 Intertemporal Inequality Aversion
In order to obtain the result mentioned above, in the standard forestry model,
we need a bit more structure on the utility function derived in Theorem 1,
based on Axioms 1-4. Speciﬁcally, we will need the utility function to be
concave, and strictly mid-concave, on I.While this is standard fare for many
17In this connection, one might note that in a recent paper, Asheim and Buchholz (2004)
work with a social preference relation, which has even less structure than ours; the SWR
in their paper is restricted only to satisfy the Pareto and Anonymity axioms.
12models of intertemporal allocation, the axiomatic basis of this requirement
is often not stressed.18 We present an exposition of this aspect of the theory
by imposing the following additional axiom on preferences.
Axiom 6 (Strong Convexity ) For c,c  ∈ C with (c − c ) ∈ D, and c  = c ,
c ∼ c







    c
The terminology “strong convexity” of preferences follows Debreu (1959,
p.61).19 The standard way to interpret this axiom is that the underlying pref-
erence structure exhibits inequality aversion, where the inequality in question
here is with respect to the intertemporal consumption pattern.
Af u n c t i o nu ∈ U will be called concave if for all x,x  ∈ L and λ ∈ (0,1),
we have u(λx +( 1− λ)x ) ≥ λu(x)+( 1− λ)u(x ). It will be called strictly
















We deﬁne the class of utility functions Uc = {u ∈ U : u is concave and
strictly mid-concave on L}.
Theorem 4 Suppose a SWR  satisﬁes Axioms 1-4 and 6. Then, there is
a utility function, u ∈ Uc, such that for all c,c  ∈ C, satisfying (c − c ) ∈ D,
c  c





t)) ≥ 0 (5)
Further, the utility function u ∈ Uc satisfying (5) is unique.
4 A Forestry Model
The standard model of forest management under intertemporal equity can
be described in terms of the objects (f,A,b,u), where (f,A,b) represent the
18See Yaari (1977) for the general result relating convexity of preference relations to
concavity of utility functions, when the preference relation has an additively separable
utility representation.
19Actually, Debreu asserts the strict preference for all non-trivial convex-combinations
of c and c . We will need the axiom only in its “strictly mid-convex” form.
13technological aspects, and u represents the preferences20. We describe each
in turn in what follows.
We begin with f, a production function from R+ to R+, which relates
t h et i m b e rc o n t e n to fat r e ef(a) to the age of the tree, a. The following
assumptions on f are maintained:
(A.1) There is ˜ a ≥ 1, such that f(a)=0for a ∈ [0,˜ a].
(A.2) f is continuous for a ≥ ˜ a, and there is a positive integer n>a ,
such that (i) f is increasing for a ∈ [˜ a,n], and (ii) f is decreasing for a>n .
(A.3) There is a positive integer m, satisfying ˜ a<m<n ,such that (i)
[f(a)/a] is maximized at a = m among all a ∈{ 1,...,n}, and (ii) [f(a)/a] <
[f(m)/m] for all a ∈{ 1,...,n}, with a  = n.
We will denote the vector (f(1),...,f(n)) by P; note that P ∈ Rn
+. In
what follows, we normalize f(n)=1by choice of units in which the timber
content is measured.
Next, we describe (A,b), which indicate the transition possibilities of
forestry land occupied by trees of diﬀerent ages. It is useful, in this con-
nection, to indicate the nature of evolution of the forest informally, before
introducing the matrix-vector notation.
Given (A.2), for any reasonable objective function of the forest man-
ager, trees will never be allowed to grow beyond age n. We therefore take
this as a condition of feasibility itself. The total land available for forestry
is taken to be one unit (by appropriate choice of units in which land is
measured). Imagine that we are starting at the end of time period 1 with
a standing forest, which might be described by the land occupied by out-
put of trees of ages 1 to n. This will be written as (y1
1,...,yn
1). At the
end of time period 1, two things are supposed to happen instantaneously,
by the nature of our point-input, point-output framework. First trees of
diﬀerent ages are harvested. Second, new seedlings (trees of age 0 )a r e
planted in the cleared areas. The land released by harvests are described
by (h1
1,...,h n
1). Since trees are never allowed to grow beyond age n, we
must have hn
1 = yn
1. The land occupied by input of trees of various ages



















1 + ···+ hn
1.
20In terms of notation (but not in terms of content) the present version diﬀers slightly
from that used in Mitra and Wan (1986). References to the earlier literature, on which
the model is based, can be found in Mitra and Wan (1986).
14The trees grow during time period 2, with trees of age a ∈{ 0,...,n−1}
at the end of time period 1, becoming trees of age a +1at the end of time
period 2. Thus, the land occupied by output of trees at the end of time





1 ). The above process is now repeated
indeﬁnitely.
This informal description can be formalized as follows. Deﬁne the n × n
matrix A and the vector b ∈ Rn as:
A =
⎡















; b =( 1 ,1,...,1)
Denote the set {x ∈ Rn
+ : bx =1 } by Q, and deﬁne a transition possibility
set by:
Ω={(y,z) ∈ Q
2 : Az ≤ y}





(yt,y t+1) ∈ Ω fort∈ N,andy 0 = y.
We can associate with a path (yt)∞






ht = yt − Ayt+1 fort∈ N












t )=( 1−| | Ayt+1||,A y t+1) fort∈ N
Note that ht ∈ Rn
+, with hn
t = yn
t for t ∈ N, and xt ∈ R
n+1
+ , with xn
t =0and
||xt|| =1for t ∈ N.
The timber content obtained by harvest ht is Ph t. So, we can associate
with a path (yt)∞
1 , the consumption sequence (ct)∞
1 deﬁned by:
ct = Pht fort∈ N
Notice that (by choice of f(n)=1), we must have ct ∈ [0,1] for t ∈ N.
Finally, we turn to preferences deﬁned on consumption sequences. We
w i l ls u p p o s et h a tt h e r ei saS W R satisfying Axioms 1-4 and 6, so there is
a unique utility function, u ∈ Uc, as described in Theorem 4 of Section 3.
15Ap a t h(y 
t)∞
1 from y ∈ Q dominates ap a t h(yt)∞
1 from y ∈ Q if the
associated consumption sequences (c 
t)∞
1 and (ct)∞
1 satisfy the condition that
(c 
t)∞
1  u (ct)∞
1 [where the SWR u, as deﬁned by (U) of Section 3, corre-
sponds to the u ∈ Uc, mentioned above]. That is,










Ap a t h(yt)∞
1 is called maximal if there is no path (y 
t)∞
1 from y which dom-
inates it.
In words, a maximal path is a path, such that there is no path (from the
same initial conditions) which is better in terms of the social welfare relation
u . It is, perhaps, worth emphasizing that this does not necessarily mean
that given any path (from the same initial conditions), a maximal path is at
l e a s ta sg o o da st h eg i v e np a t h ;i nf a c t ,the two paths need not be comparable.
Thus, the deﬁnition of maximality (like the deﬁnition of Pareto eﬃciency)
allows for multiple maximal points on the feasible set, given the pre-order.21
5 Maximum Sustained Yield Forest
Suppose the forest does not change at all from one period to the next. What
is the “best” composition of the forest in that case ? This is what is meant
when one speaks of the forest with the maximum sustained yield. In the
terminology of intertemporal allocation theory, one is concerned here with
the “golden-rule” forest.
We show that there is a unique golden-rule forest, and obtain dual vari-
ables (shadow prices) which provide “price support” to such a forest. These
shadow prices are in fact prices (expressed in terms of the utility good) of the
various subplots of land, according to the age of trees standing on each sub-
plot. The golden rule prices maximize “generalized proﬁt” [the utility plus
the valuation of terminal subplots of land minus the valuation of initial plots
of land, terminal and initial referring to a unit time period] at the golden-rule
forest among all possible activities in the transition possibility set.
21It will turn out, as noted later in Section 8, that there is actually a unique maximal
path (from given initial conditions) in the model we are analyzing. But, this is a result of
the notion of maximality applied to the standard forestry model; it is not deﬁnitional.
16We go on to show (in Proposition 1) that those points in the transition
possibility set which stay away (uniformly) from the golden-rule must suﬀer
a (uniform) loss of “generalized proﬁt” (compared to the golden-rule forest),
when evaluated at the golden-rule prices.
To discuss the golden-rule, let us introduce the welfare function, w :Ω→
L, deﬁned by:
w(y,z)=u(P(y − Az)) forall(y,z) ∈ Ω
A golden-rule forest is a vector ¯ y ∈ Q which solves the problem:
Max u(P(y − Ay))
subject to (y,y) ∈ Ω
 
(GR)
Since u is increasing, the above problem is the same as:
Max P(y − Ay)




To characterize the golden-rule, note that for (y,y) ∈ Ω, we have yi ≥ yi+1
for i ∈{ 1,...,n− 1}. So, we get:
P(y − Ay)=P1(y1 − y2)+···+ Pn−1(yn−1 − yn)+Pnyn
= P1(y1 − y2)+[ P2/2]2(y2 − y3)+···
+[Pn−1/(n − 1)](n − 1)(yn−1 − yn)+[ Pn/n]nyn
≤ [Pm/m][(y1 − y2)+2 ( y2 − y3)+···+( n − 1)(yn−1 − yn)+nyn
=[ Pm/m][y1 + y2 + ···+ yn−1 + yn]
=[ Pm/m]
the inequality following from assumption (A.3)(i) on f.Deﬁning ¯ y = [(1/m),...,(1/m),0,...,0]
in Q, it follows that ¯ y is a golden-rule forest.
By (A.3)(ii), a strict inequality is produced in the above calculation,
unless yi − yi+1 =0for all i ∈{ 1,...,n− 1}, with i  = m and yn =
0. Thus, if y is a golden-rule forest, then y =( ym,...,y m,0,...,0), and
since y ∈ Q, we must in fact have y =[ ( 1 /m),...,(1/m),0,...,0]. Thus,
¯ y =[ ( 1 /m),...,(1/m),0,...,0] is the unique golden-rule forest. Clearly, the
consumption associated with a golden-rule forest is stationary, and equal to
[Pm/m]; we will denote it by ¯ c.
17A convenient “price support property” of the golden-rule may now be
noted. Deﬁne:




+(¯ c) is the right-hand derivative of u at ¯ c. Then, we have:
u(P(y − Az)) + pz − py ≤ u(¯ c) forall(y,z) ∈ Ω (6)
To see this, note that P ≤ q by (A.3). Thus, for (y,z) ∈ Ω, we have:
P(y − Az) ≤ q(y − Az)=qy − qz + q(z − Az) (7)
Now, (q − qA)=¯ c(1,2,...,n) − ¯ c(0,1,...,n− 1) = ¯ c(1,...,1,1), so q(z −
Az)=( q − qA)z =¯ c||z|| =¯ c. Thus, (7) yields:
P(y − Az) ≤ qy − qz +¯ cf o r a l l (y,z) ∈ Ω (8)
Using the concavity of u,w eh a v e :
u(P(y − Az)) − u(¯ c) ≤ u
 
+(¯ c)[P(y − Az) − ¯ c] ≤ u
 
+(¯ c)[qy − qz] (9)
the last inequality in (9) following from (8). Using p = u 
+(¯ c)q and rearrang-
ing terms in (9) yields (6). We will refer to the p deﬁned in (GRP) as the
golden-rule price.
Following McKenzie (1968), let us deﬁne the value loss of operating at
(y,z) ∈ Ω as:
δ(y,z)=u(¯ c) − [u(P(y − Az)) + pz − py] (10)
Clearly, δ(y,z) ≥ 0 for all (y,z) ∈ Ω, and δ(¯ y,¯ y)=0 .
The points which have zero value-loss have a very special structure, as
we note in the following result22. For this purpose, we denote the vector
(1/m)em [where em is the m − th unit vector in Rn ]b yg.
Proposition 1 (i)If (y,z) ∈ Ω and δ(y,z)=0 , then:
(y − Az)=g (11)
(ii) Given ε>0, there is δ>0, such that if (y,z) ∈ Ω, and d((y −
Az),g) ≥ ε, then δ(y,z) ≥ δ.
22The second part of this Proposition is a result along the lines of the well-known “value-
loss lemma”, due to Radner (1961), Atsumi (1965), and McKenzie (1968).
18Proof. ( i )N o t et h a tt h ei n e q u a l i t yi n( 6 )d e p e n d so nt h ei n e q u a l i t i e si n
(7) and (9). Using (7), we can see that in order to have δ(y,z)=0 , we must
have:
yi − zi+1 =0foralli∈{ 1,...,n− 1},i = m, and yn =0
Thus, (y − Az) must be of the form (0,0,...,y m − zm+1,0,...,0). Thus, we
must have P(y − Az)=Pm(ym − zm+1). Denoting Pm(ym − zm+1) by c, we
see from the left-hand inequality in (9),
u(c) − u(¯ c) ≤ u
 
+(¯ c)[c − ¯ c] (12)
In order to have δ(y,z)=0 , we must have equality in (12).
If c  =¯ c, then deﬁning c  =( 1
2)c +( 1
2)¯ c, we have by concavity of u, and










)u(¯ c)−u(¯ c) <u (c









and we cannot have equality in (12). Thus, for equality in (12), we must
have c =¯ c. Thus, (ym − zm+1)=( 1 /m), so that (y − Az)=g.
(ii) Suppose, on the contrary, there is a sequence (ys,zs) ∈ Ω with s ∈ N,
such that d((ys − Azs),g) ≥ ε, but δ(ys,zs) → 0 as s →∞ . Since Ω is
compact, there is a subsequence (ys,zs) of (ys,zs), converging to (ˆ y,ˆ z) ∈ Ω.
Since d((ys − Azs),g) ≥ ε, we must have d((ˆ y − Aˆ z),g) ≥ ε. By (11), we
must have δ(ˆ y,ˆ z) > 0.
Since (ys,zs) converges to (ˆ y,ˆ z), we must have δ(ys,zs) converging to
δ(ˆ y,ˆ z), by (10) and the continuity of u. Since δ(ys,zs) → 0, we have δ(ˆ y,ˆ z)=
0, a contradiction to the result obtained in the previous paragraph.
6 Long-Run Properties of Maximal Paths
In this section, we establish the following long-run property of maximal paths:
there is asymptotic convergence to the maximum sustained yield forest, start-
ing from an arbitrary initial forest. This provides a theoretical justiﬁcation
for focusing on the maximum sustained yield forest as a goal of forestry
policy.
We show that from every initial forest, one can reach the steady-state of
the golden-rule forest in a ﬁnite number of periods (Lemma 1). Thus, there
19are always paths which suﬀers ﬁnite value losses (in terms of the sum of gener-
alized proﬁts evaluated at the golden-rule prices) compared to the golden-rule
forest, over the inﬁnite horizon. Such paths are called “good paths”, and a
maximal path is shown (in Proposition 2) to be a good path. Because activi-
ties which stay away uniformly from the golden rule must suﬀer uniform per
period value loss (Proposition 1 in the previous section), paths which stay
away uniformly from the golden-rule for an inﬁnite number of periods must
suﬀer inﬁnite value losses. Thus good paths (which, by deﬁnition, suﬀer only
ﬁnite value losses) must exhibit asymptotic convergence to the golden-rule.
Consequently, maximal paths must also exhibit this property, since they are
good paths (Theorem 5).23
The principal technical result needed for our analysis is the ability to
move from any initial forest to any other forest in a ﬁnite number of periods,
independent of the initial and terminal compositions. In fact, we show that
this transition can always be made in (n +1 )periods.
Lemma 1 Given any (y,ˆ y) ∈ Q2, there exist (z1,...,z n+2) such that:
(i)( zs,z s+1) ∈ Ω fors=1 ,...,n+1 ;( ii) z1 = y, zn+2 =ˆ y. (13)
Proof. The proof consists of simply deﬁning (z1,...,z n+2) appropriately
and checking that it satisﬁes (13). Let us deﬁne (z1,...,z n+2) as follows:
z1 = y
z2 =( 1 ,0,...,0)
z3 =( ˆ yn,1 − ˆ yn,0,...,0)
z4 =( ˆ yn−1, ˆ yn,1 − ˆ yn − ˆ yn−1,0,...,0)
... ... ...
zn+1 =( ˆ y2, ˆ y3,...,ˆ yn, ˆ y1)
zn+2 =ˆ y
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
It is straightforward to verify from this deﬁnition that (13) holds.
Following Gale (1967), let us call a path (yt)∞
1 good if there is a real
number ¯ G such that:
T  
t=1
[u(P(yt − Ayt+1)) − u(¯ c)] ≥ ¯ Gfo ra l lT∈ N
23For an excellent non-technical discussion of the methods used in Mitra and Wan (1986),
which parallel the methods used in this section (as well as the previous one) see the recent
paper by M. Ali Khan (2004).
20Informally, a good path is one which is at most ﬁnitely worse that the golden-
rule path in terms of partial sums of its utlities.
We now show, using Lemma 1, that a maximal path is necessarily good,
so that it inherits all the well-known long-run properties of good paths.
Proposition 2 Let (yt)∞
1 be a maximal path from y ∈ Q. Then (yt)∞
1 is
good.




[u(P(yt − Ayt+1)) − u(¯ c)] ≥ G (14)




[u(P(yt − Ayt+1)) − u(¯ c)] <G (15)
Since (y,¯ y) ∈ Q2, w ec a nu s eL e m m a1t oo b t a i n(z1,...,z n+2) such that:
(i)( zs,z s+1) ∈ Ω fors=1 ,...,n+1 ;( ii) z1 = y, zn+2 =¯ y. (16)







s+1) ∈ Ω fors=1 ,...,n+1 ;( ii) z
 
1 =¯ y, z
 
n+2 = yT+1. (17)




t = zt for t=1 ,...,n+2
y 
t =¯ yf o r t = n +3 ,...,T− (n +1 )
y 
t = z 
t−(T−n−1) for t= T − n,...,T+1
y 





Using (16), (17) and (18) it is easy to check that (y 
t)∞
1 i sap a t hf r o my ∈ Q.
Since y 
t = yt for t ≥ T +1 , we have c 
t = ct for t ≥ T +1 , and c 
t =¯ c for







t+1)) − u(¯ c)] ≥− 2(n +1 ) u(¯ c)=G (19)











But, this implies that (yt)∞
1 is not maximal, a contradiction. Thus, our claim
(14) must hold, and it follows that (yt)∞
1 is good.
U s i n gt h ea b o v ep r o p o s i t i o n ,w ec a nnow summarize the long-run prop-
erties of maximal paths in the following theorem24. To this end, given a path
(yt)∞
1 from y ∈ Q, we associate with it a value-loss sequence (δt)∞
1 deﬁned
by:
δt = δ(yt,y t+1) fort∈ N
Theorem 5 Let (yt)∞
1 be a maximal path from y ∈ Q. Then, we have:
∞  
t=1
δt < ∞ (20)
δt → 0 as t →∞ (21)
d((yt − Ayt+1),g) → 0 as t →∞ (22)
d(yt, ¯ y) → 0 as t →∞ (23)
Proof. Given any T ∈ N, we can use (6) to write:
T  
t=1
[u(P(yt − Ayt+1)) − u(¯ c)] =
T  
t=1













[u(P(yt − Ayt+1)) − u(¯ c)] ≥ Gf o r a l l T∈ N (25)
24The analysis follows Mitra and Wan (1986) closely.
22U s i n g( 2 4 )a n d( 2 5 ) ,w eo b t a i n :
T  
t=1
δt ≤ py − G ≤ n − Gf o r a l l T∈ N (26)
Since δt ≥ 0 by (6), (26) establishes (20). Clearly, (21) follows immediately
from (20). Using Proposition 1 and (21), we obtain (22).
We now verify (23) as follows. Using (22), given any ε>0, we can choose
T ∈ N, such that:
d((yt − Ayt+1),g) < (ε/n
4) fort≥ T (27)
We will show that:
d(ys+m, ¯ y) ≤ εfo ra l ls>T (28)








t+1 > (1/m) − (ε/n4)
 
(29)















t+1) > (1/m) − (ε/n
3) (30)













> (1/m) − (ε/n
3) − r(ε/n
4)
≥ (1/m) − (ε/n
2) (31)
U s i n g( 3 0 )a n d( 3 1 ) ,w eh a v ef o rt>T,
y
j
t+j > (1/m) − (ε/n
2) forj =1 ,...,m (32)





s+m < 1 − m[(1/m) − (ε/n
2)] = mε/n
2 (33)
23Also, using (32), we claim that:
y
i
s+m < (1/m)+( ε/n) fori=1 ,...,m (34)
For if yi










s+m > (1/m)+( ε/n)+( m − 1)[(1/m) − (ε/n
2)] ≥ 1
which contradicts the fact that ys+m ∈ Q. This establishes our claim (34).
Now, using (32) and (34), we have:
|y
i
s+m − (1/m)| < (ε/n) fori=1 ,...,m (35)



















This establishes (28) and therefore (23).
7 Shadow Prices for Maximal Paths
Our investigation of the forestry model so far has shown that its central
results under intergenerational equity can be obtained without any reference
to the overtaking criterion. Our notion of maximality, based completely on
ranking of paths which are eventually identical, suﬃces for this purpose.
However, in order to tie up our present study with the earlier study by
Mitra and Wan (1986), we need to investgate the relation of maximal paths
to paths which are “optimal” according to the overtaking criterion, a precise
deﬁnition of which is given below.
We continue to suppose that there is a SWR  satisfying Axioms 1-4 and
6, so there is a unique utility function, u ∈ Uc, as described in Theorem 4 of
Section 3.
24Ap a t h(y 
t)∞
1 from y ∈ Q weakly overtakes ap a t h(yt)∞
1 from y ∈ Q if the
associated consumption sequences (c 
t)∞
1 and (ct)∞




1 [where the SWR Ru as deﬁned by (R) in Section 3, corresponds
to the u ∈ Uc mentioned above]. This will be the case if and only if there is

















u(ct) for a subsequence N
 of N ≥ ¯ N
Ap a t h(yt)∞
1 from y ∈ Q is called optimal if there is no path (y 
t)∞
1 from y
w h i c hw e a k l yo v e r t a k e si t .
In words, an optimal path is a path, such that there is no path (from
t h es a m ei n i t i a lc o n d i t i o n s )w h i c hi sb e t t e ri nt e r m so ft h es o c i a lw e l f a r e
relation Ru. It is worth noting, by comparing the deﬁnitions of maximality
and optimality, that an optimal path is necessarily maximal.
This brings us to the part of our paper which distinguishes the present
analysis of the forest management problem from the one oﬀered in Mitra and
Wan (1986). This distinction parallels the diﬀerence in approaches used by
Brock (1970a) on the one hand, and by Gale (1967) and McKenzie (1968) on
the other, in developing the general theory of optimal intertemporal alloca-
tion under the overtaking criterion.
Brock (1970a) showed that the theory of optimal intertemporal allocation
under the overtaking criterion can be developed fully without ﬁnding shadow
prices to support inﬁnite-horizon paths. One only needs the price-support
property of the golden-rule, a technically simple problem. In the theory
presented by Gale (1967) and McKenzie(1968, 1986), however, shadow prices
supporting inﬁnite-horizon paths is an integral aspect.
Unlike the golden-rule prices, the prices supporting a (non-stationary)
maximal or optimal path are typically time varying. However, their role
is similar. In any time period, at the prices associated with a maximal (or
optimal) path, the activity chosen along the maximal (or optimal) path max-
imizes generalized proﬁt [the utility plus the valuation of terminal subplots of
land minus the valuation of initial plots of land, terminal and initial referring
to the time period in question] among all possible activities in the transition
possibility set.
25Roughly speaking, the analysis of forest management oﬀered in Mitra and
Wan (1986) follows Brock (1970a) quite closely. When it comes to studying
long-run behavior of maximal paths, this theory again turns out to be the
most elegant one to apply, as we have indicated in the previous section.
But, now, we need to concern ourselves with short-run behavior as well.
If “errant” behavior can occur in the short-run along maxim a lp a t h s ,w h i c h
would not occur on optimal paths (according to the overtaking criterion),
this would destroy to some extent the importance of the concept of maximal
paths. The fact that such errant behavior cannot occur in the short-run
along maximal paths is at the heart of establishing an equivalence between a
maximal path and an optimal path. In order to demonstrate this, we need to
ﬁnd shadow prices to support a maximal path. Thus, the theory relating to
shadow prices, proposed by Gale (1967) and McKenzie (1968, 1986), becomes
very useful in the present context.
Unfortunately, a part of this theory cannot be applied directly, because
the model of forestry has characteristics which violate some of the standard
assumptions under which the general theory of optimal intertemporal alloca-
tion has been developed. We use a version of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem due
to Arrow, Hurwicz and Uzawa (1961), and then follow the Gale-McKenzie
approach to obtain the appropriate shadow prices. The appropriate result is
stated in Proposition 3; its proof is quite involved, although it uses methods
familiar in the literature on the general theory of intertemporal allocation
that we have repeatedly referred to.
To proceed with our analysis, we will make the following assumption25
on the utility function, u.
(A.4) u is continuously diﬀerentiable on R+, with B ≡ u (0) < ∞.





u(c) for c∈ I
u (0)cf o r c < 0
u (1)(c − 1) + u(1) for c>1
25While this assumption is crucial to our method of investigation (duality theory), it
is not clear whether it is indispensable for the results of the next section on the relation
between maximal and optimal paths. It would seem that a “primal route” to those results
should be possible. See Mitra (2003) for such an approach in the context of aggregative
models of economic growth and renewable resources. In any case, the duality theory
developed in the current section (using (A.4)) might be of interest, independent of its
application to obtain the results of the next section.
26Then w is concave and continuously diﬀerentiable on R, with w(c)=u(c)
for c ∈ L. Deﬁne W : R2n → R by:
W(y,z)=w(P(y − Az))
Then W is continuously diﬀerentiable on its domain.
Proposition 3 Suppose (˜ yt)∞
1 is a maximal path from ˜ y ∈ Q. Then, there
is N ∈ N,N>1,and a sequence of shadow prices (˜ pt)∞
N−1 such that:
(i) ˜ pt ∈ Rn
+ and ˜ pt ≤ (2n +1 ) Bb for all t ∈ N,w i t ht≥ N − 1;
(ii) If (yt)∞
1 i sap a t hf r o m˜ y ∈ Q, then:
N−1  
t=1
u(P(yt − Ayt+1)) + ˜ pNyN ≤
N−1  
t=1
u(P(˜ yt − A˜ yt+1)) + ˜ pN˜ yN (36)
(iii) For t ≥ N − 1, and for all (y,z) ∈ Ω,
u(P(y − Az)) + ˜ pt+1z − ˜ pty ≤ u(P(˜ yt − A˜ yt+1)) + ˜ pt+1˜ yt+1 − ˜ pt˜ yt (37)
Proof. Since (˜ yt)∞
1 is maximal, given any T ∈ N, (˜ y1,...,˜ yT+1) must











Suppose on the contrary that there is (y1,...,y T+1), satisfying the constraints
of problem (F), for which the following holds:
W(yt,y t+1) >W(˜ yt, ˜ yt+1) (38)
Then, we can deﬁne (y 
t)∞
1 as: y 
t = yt for t =1 ,...,T +1 , and y 
t =˜ yt for
t>T+1 . T h e n ,i ti se a s yt oc h e c kt h a t(y 
t)∞
1 is a path from y, for which
c 










u(P(˜ yt − A˜ yt+1))
a contradiction to the fact that (˜ yt)∞
1 is maximal.
27We now proceed to examine the constrained maximum problem. In order
to apply the Kuhn-Tucker theorem to it, we write it ﬁrst in the “standard





subject to yt − Ayt+1 ≥ 0 fort=1 ,...,T
yt ≥ 0 fort=1 ,...,T+1
y1 − ˜ y1 ≥ 0
˜ y1 − y1 ≥ 0
yT+1 − ˜ yT+1 ≥ 0




t ≥ 0 fort=1 ,...,T+1  n
i=1 yi
t − 1 ≥ 0 fort=1 ,...,T+1
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
(F
 )
among all (y1,...,y T+1) ∈ Y. Notice that the set Y is open. The constraint
functions are all linear, and hence continuously diﬀerentiable on Y. The ob-
jective function is continuously diﬀerentiable on Y, by the way W was deﬁned
and assumption (A.4). The Arrow-Hurwicz-Uzawa constraint qualiﬁcation is
met since the constraint functions are all linear. Thus, we can apply their ver-
sion of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem to obtain (r1,...,r T) ≥ 0,(ν1,...,νT+1) ≥
0,α≥ 0,α   ≥ 0,ω ≥ 0,ω  ≥ 0,(µ1,...,µ T+1) ≥ 0,(µ 
1,...,µ  
T+1) ≥ 0, such
that:
−u
 (˜ ct)PA+ u
 (˜ ct+1)P +[ rt+1 − rtA]+νt+1 − µt+1b + µ
 
t+1b =0 (39)
fort =1 ,...,T− 1
u
 (˜ c1)P + r1 + ν1 + α − α




 (˜ cT)PA− rTA + νT+1 + ω − ω
  − µT+1b + µ
 
T+1b =0 (41)
r(t)(˜ yt − A˜ yt+1)=0 fort=1 ,...,T− 1 (42)
ν(t)˜ y(t)=0fort=1 ,...,T+1 (43)
α(y1 − ˜ y1)+α
 (˜ y1 − y1)=0 (44)
ω(yT+1 − ˜ yT+1)+ω













t − 1) = 0 (46)
28Let us deﬁne (q1,...,q T) by qt = u (˜ ct)P for t =1 ,...,T,and (p1,...,p T)
by pt = qt + rt for t =1 ,...,T. Now, let us consider any (y,z) ∈ Ω, and
t ∈{ 1,...,T− 1}. Then, using (39), we have:
qtAz = qt+1z +[ rt+1 − rtA]z + νt+1z − µt+1bz + µ
 
t+1bz
= qt+1z +[ rt+1 − rtA]z + νt+1z − µt+1 + µ
 
t+1 (47)
Using (47), we obtain:
qty − qtAz = qty − qt+1z − [rt+1 − rtA]z − νt+1z + µt+1 − µ
 
t+1 (48)
Using (A.4), we have:
u(P(y − Az)) − u(P(˜ yt − A˜ yt+1)) ≤ u
 (˜ ct)[P(y − Az) − P(˜ yt − A˜ yt+1)]
= qty − qtAz − [qt˜ yt − qtA˜ yt+1] (49)
Using (42),(43) and (48) in (49), we obtain:
u(P(y − Az)) − u(P(˜ yt − A˜ yt+1)) ≤ qty − qt+1z − [rt+1 − rtA]z − νt+1z
−[qt˜ yt − qt+1˜ yt+1 − [rt+1 − rtA]˜ yt+1]
≤ qty − qt+1z − rt+1z + rty
−[qt˜ yt − qt+1˜ yt+1 − rt+1˜ yt+1 + rt˜ yt]
= pty − pt+1z − [pt˜ yt − pt+1˜ yt+1]
Transposing terms, we see that for all (y,z) ∈ Ω, and t ∈{ 1,...,T− 1},
u(P(y − Az)) + pt+1z − pty ≤ u(P(˜ yt − A˜ yt+1)) + pt+1˜ yt+1 − pt˜ yt (50)
To summarize this ﬁrst part of the proof, given T ∈ N, we have obtained
(p1,...,p T) ≥ 0, such that for all (y,z) ∈ Ω, and t ∈{ 1,...,T − 1}, (50)
holds.
The vector (p1,...,p T) obtained above depends, of course, on the T ∈ N
that is given to begin with, and one would write (p1{T},...,p T{T}) to record
this explicitly . In order to obtain an inﬁnite sequence (¯ pt)∞
1 from these ﬁnite
vectors, one would use a Cantor diagonal process argument; a pre-requisite
to applying this argument is to show that for each t ∈ N, there is a real
number Bt, such that ||pt{T}|| ≤ Bt for all T ≥ t.
It turns out that showing that such bounds exist for all t ∈ N is somewhat
problematic in the forestry model. Speciﬁcally, showing that there are such
29bounds on all rt{T} creates diﬃculties. However, it is possible to show that
there is N ∈ N, such that bounds exist for all t ≥ N. This is why the
statement of our theorem is split up into two parts, instead of the standard
Gale-McKenzie formulation, where (38) would be established for all t ∈ N.
We now proceed with the details of the second part of the proof. Since
(˜ yt)∞
1 is maximal, it is good. So, we can ﬁnd N  ∈ N, such that for all t ≥ N ,
˜ y
i
t ≥ (1/2m) fori=1 ,...,m;˜ h
m
t ≥ (1/2m)
We conﬁne our attention henceforth to those T ∈ N which satisfy T>N   +
n.Given any such T , we have non-negative vectors (r1{T},...,r T{T}),(q1{T},...,q T{T})
and (p1{T},...,p T{T}) as deﬁned above, satisfying for all (y,z) ∈ Ω, and
t ∈{ 1,...,T− 1},
u(P(y−Az))+pt+1{T}z−pt{T}y ≤ u(P(˜ yt−A˜ yt+1))+pt+1{T}˜ yt+1−pt{T}˜ yt
(51)
Clearly, using the above deﬁnition of qt{T} and (A.4), we have:
qt{T}≤BP ≤ Bb for t ∈{ 1,...,T} (52)
It remains to ﬁnd appropriate bounds for rt{T}.
Deﬁne ηt+1{T} = µt+1{T}−µ 
t+1{T} for t =1 ,...,T+1. Using (39), we
get:
ηt+1{T}b = −qt{T}A + qt+1{T}−rt{T}A + rt+1{T} + νt+1{T}
≥− qt{T}A − rt{T}A (53)
Since the ﬁrst component of the vector on the right hand side of (53) is 0,
and b =( 1 ,...,1), we must have ηt+1{T}≥0.
Using (39) again and noting that:
ηt+1{T}b = −qt{T}A + qt+1{T}−rt{T}A + rt+1{T} + νt+1{T}









For t ≥ N , we have ˜ hm
t ≥ (1/2m), and ˜ ym
t ≥ (1/2m).So by (42), we have
rm
t {T} =0 , and by (43), we have νm
t {T} =0 . Using this information in (54),
together with (52) yields:
ηt+1{T}≤Bf o rT≥ t ≥ N
  − 1 (55)
30U s i n g( 5 2 )a n d( 5 5 )i n( 3 9 ) ,w eh a v ef o rT ≥ t ≥ N  − 1,
rt+1{T}−rt{T}A = qt{T}A − qt+1{T}−νt+1{T} + ηt+1{T}b
≤ qt{T}A + ηt+1{T}b
≤ 2Bb (56)
We can now use (56) to obtain:
r1
t+1{T}≤2Bf o r t ≥ N  − 1
r2
t+1{T}≤4Bf o r t ≥ N 
r3
t+1{T}≤6Bf o r t ≥ N  +1
··· ··· ···
rn
t+1{T}≤2nB for t ≥ N  + n − 2
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
This implies that:
rt+1{T}≤2nBb for T ≥ t ≥ N
  + n − 2
Thus, denoting (N  + n) by N, we have:
pt+1{T}≤(2n +1 ) Bb for T ≥ t ≥ N − 2 (57)
These are the bounds on the shadow prices that we need. This completes
the second part of the proof.
Let (yt)∞
1 be a path from y ∈ Q. Using (51), we obtain:
N−1  
t=1
[u(P(yt − Ayt+1)) − u(P(˜ yt − A˜ yt+1)) ≤ pN{T}(˜ yN − yN) (58)
We have now established that for each T>N ,t h e r ei sav e c t o r(pN−1{T},...,p T{T}),
such that:
0 ≤ pt+1{T}≤(2n +1 ) Bb for N − 2 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 (59)
holds, (58) holds, and for all (y,z) ∈ Ω, and for all N − 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
u(P(y−Az))+pt+1{T}z−pt{T}y ≤ u(P(˜ yt−A˜ yt+1))+pt+1{T}˜ yt+1−pt{T}˜ yt
(60)
holds.
31Given (59), we can now use the Cantor diagonal process to obtain a
subsequence T  of T(>N ), and a sequence (˜ pt)∞
N−1 such that, for each t ≥
N − 1
pt(T
 ) → ˜ pt as T
  →∞ (61)
Using (61) in (58) yields (36). Using (61) in (60) yields (37). Using (61) in
(59) yields:
0 ≤ ˜ pt ≤ (2n +1 ) Bb for t ≥ N − 1 (62)
This completes the third and last part of the proof.
8 Maximal Paths are Optimal
In this section, we use the results of the previous two sections to show that
the notions of maximality and optimality coincide for our forestry model.
To this end, recall from the deﬁnitions of optimal and maximal paths
that an optimal path must be maximal. It is the reverse implication that is
non-trivial and of signiﬁcant interest.
To make the discussion non-void, we show (in Theorem 6) that there
exists an optimal path from every initial forest, by following the method of
Brock (1970a). Then, using the price support property of maximal paths
(established in Proposition 3), we show( i nT h e o r e m7 )t h a tam a x i m a lp a t h
is necessarily optimal.
We ﬁrst present our result on the existence of an optimal path. We pro-
vide a fairly self-contained treatment of this familiar topic in intertemporal
allocation theory, because there are several diﬀerences between our frame-
work and the one typically used in the standard version of this theory.
Theorem 6 There exists an optimal path (˜ yt)∞
1 from every ˜ y ∈ Q.
Proof. We ﬁrst note that there is a good path from ˜ y. Since (˜ y,¯ y) ∈ Q2
[where ¯ y is the golden-rule] we ca nu s eL e m m a1t oo b t a i n(z1,...,z n+2) such
that:
(i)( zs,z s+1) ∈ Ω fors=1 ,...,n+1 ;( ii) z1 =˜ y, zn+2 =¯ y.




t = zt for t=1 ,...,n+2
y 
t =¯ yf o r t > n +2
 
32It is easy to check that (y 
t)∞
1 i sap a t hf r o my ∈ Q. Since y 
t =¯ y for t>n+2,
we have c 











Next, we claim that for any good path (yt)∞




To see this, observe that for any T ∈ N, we can use (6) to write:
T  
t=1
[u(P(yt − Ayt+1)) − u(¯ c)] =
T  
t=1









1 is good, there is G ∈ R such that:
T  
t=1




δt ≤ py − G ≤ n − Gf o r a l l T∈ N
Since δt ≥ 0 by (6), this establishes our claim.
We now deﬁne:





1 is a good path from x}
Since there is a good path from x, δ(˜ y) is well-deﬁned and δ(˜ y) < ∞.
33Given the deﬁnition of δ(˜ y), we can choose a sequence of paths (yt{N})∞
1
from ˜ y (for N =1 ,2,3,... ) such that:
∞  
t=0
δt{N}≤δ(˜ y)+( 1 /N) forN =1 ,2,3,...
Since for each N =1 ,2,3,..., we have yt{N}∈Q for t ≥ 1, we can use
the Cantor diagonal process to ﬁnd a subsequence N  of N , and a sequence
(˜ yt)∞
1 such that, for each t ∈ N, we have
yt{N
 }→˜ yt as N
  →∞
It can be checked that (˜ yt)∞
1 is a path from ˜ y, and for each t ∈ N, we have:
δt{N
 }→˜ δt as N
  →∞













t=1˜ δt, pick a number γ  such that γ>γ   >δ (˜ y). Then, we

















 }≤δ(˜ y)+( 1 /N
 )
Letting N  →∞ , we get γ  ≤ δ(˜ y), which contradicts the deﬁnition of γ .
This establishes our claim.
34Consider the path (˜ yt)∞
1 from ˜ y, deﬁned above. It is easy to check that
(˜ yt)∞
1 is a good path. We will show that it is an optimal path from ˜ y.Suppose,
on the contrary, there is a path (y 
t)∞
1 from ˜ y, such that the associated con-
sumption sequences (c 
t)∞
1 and (˜ ct)∞




[where the pre-order Ru is deﬁned by (R)]. This will be the case if and only

















u(˜ ct) for a subsequence N
 of N ≥ ¯ N (64)
Deﬁne a sequence (y  
t )∞




2)˜ yt for t ∈ N. It is easy to
check that (y  
t )∞
1 i sap a t hf r o m˜ y, and its associated consumption sequence
(c  
t)∞




2)˜ ct for t ∈ N. Using (64), we know that c 
t  =˜ ct
for some t = τ ∈ N. Then, by concavity of u, and strict mid-concavity of u,
we have:




2)u(˜ ct) forallt∈ N




2)u(˜ ct)] > 0 fort= τ (65)









u(˜ ct)] forallN ≥ ˜ N (66)
This shows that (y  
t )∞
1 i sa l s oag o o dp a t hf r o m˜ y.
















t+1)) − u(P(˜ yt − A˜ yt+1))]











Since (y  
t )∞
1 and (˜ yt)∞
1 are both good paths from ˜ y, we have y  
N+1 → ¯ y and
˜ yN+1 → ¯ y as N →∞ .Thus, we can choose N1 such that for N ≥ N1, we have
35[p˜ yN+1 − py  
N+1] < (1
2)ξ. Given the deﬁnition of δ(˜ y) and the path (˜ yt)∞
1 , we
can choose N2 such that for N ≥ N2, we have [
 N
















But this contradicts (66) and establishes that (˜ yt)∞
1 is optimal from ˜ y.
Next, we show that a maximal path is necessarily optimal. This depends
on the methods used by Gale (1967) and McKenzie (1968), and relies on
the shadow prices associated with maximal paths, derived in the previous
section.
Theorem 7 Ap a t h(˜ yt)∞
1 from ˜ y ∈ Q is maximal if and only if it is optimal.
Proof. If a path (˜ yt)∞
1 from ˜ y ∈ Q is optimal, then by deﬁnitions of
optimality and maximality, (˜ yt)∞
1 is a maximal path from ˜ y ∈ Q.
To establish the converse result, let (˜ yt)∞
1 b eam a x i m a lp a t hf r o m˜ y ∈ Q.
We will show that it is optimal. Suppose this is not the case. Then there is
ap a t h(y 
t)∞




1 satisfy the condition that (c 
t)∞
1 Pu(˜ ct)∞
1 [where the pre-order Ru is

















u(˜ ct) for a subsequence T
 of T ≥ ¯ N (69)
Deﬁne a sequence (yt)∞
1 by: yt =( 1
2)y 
t +( 1
2)˜ yt for t ∈ N. It is easy to
check that (yt)∞
1 is a path from ˜ y, and its associated consumption sequence
(ct)∞
1 satisﬁes: ct =( 1
2)c 
t +(1
2)˜ ct for t ∈ N. Using (69), we know that c 
t  =˜ ct
for some t = τ ∈ N. Then, by concavity of u, and strict mid-concavity of u,
we have:
(a) u(ct) ≥ (1
2)u(c 
t)+(1
2)u(˜ ct) forallt∈ N
(b) ξ ≡ u(ct) − [(1
2)u(c 
t)+(1
2)u(˜ ct)] > 0 fort= τ (70)







u(˜ ct)] forallT ≥ ˜ N (71)
Since (˜ yt)∞
1 is a maximal path from ˜ y ∈ Q, it is a good path from ˜ y, by
Proposition 2. The inequality (71) shows that (yt)∞
1 is also a good path from
˜ y.
Since (˜ yt)∞
1 is a maximal path from ˜ y ∈ Q, we can use Proposition 3 to
obtain N ∈ N,N>1,and a sequence of shadow prices (˜ pt)∞
N−1 such that:
0 ≤ ˜ pt ≤ (2n +1 ) Bb for all t ∈ N,w i t ht≥ N − 1 (72)
and (36) and (37) hold. Deﬁning ˆ N =m a x [ N, ˜ N], and using (36) and (37),










[u(P(yt − Ayt+1)) − u(P(˜ yt − A˜ yt+1))]
≤ ˜ pT+1(˜ xT+1 − xT+1) (73)
Since (yt)∞
1 and (˜ yt)∞
1 are both good paths from ˜ y, we have yT+1 → ¯ y and
˜ yT+1 → ¯ y as T →∞ . Thus, using (72), we must have ˜ pT+1(˜ xT+1−xT+1) → 0
as T →∞ . Using this in (73) contradicts (71) and establishes the result.
9 Concluding Remarks
Our analysis of forest management has tried to provide a more satisfactory
basis for focusing on maximum sustained yield of timber as a key concept,
given the objective of intergenerational equity. Since forest management in-
volves much more than timber production, it would be interesting to general-
ize the analysis to a setting of sustainable forest management, where all forest
products are taken into account. Since, in principle, such an exercise would
s t i l lﬁ ti n t ot h eg e n e r a lt h e o r yo fi n t e r temporal allocation, we feel that such
a generalization would be theoretically feasible. The inter-relationships that
would have to prevail between the various forest products at the maximum
sustained forest yield solution would reﬂect the actual biological features gov-
erning the (joint production) of forest products, and should be of interest to
foresters.
37We note that, even as a model of timber management, our framework
is greatly oversimpliﬁed, and we comment on possible generalizations. (i)
H a r v e s t i n ga n dr e p l a n t i n gc o s t sc a nb ei n c o r p o r a t e di n t ot h em o d e lf a i r l y
easily. (ii) All trees coming to maturity at the same time might have a lower
timber yield per tree compared to a situation in which trees come to maturity
on diﬀerent subplots in diﬀerent years. This aspect is less straightforward to
incorporate into our model, because of the nature of the biological interaction
among trees that is being captured. In such a scenario, one would expect to
see (at least in transition) the phenomenon of “forest thinning” on maximal
paths. We feel, however, that such considerations would tend to reinforce
the concept of the golden-rule forest in the long-run, since the adverse eﬀect
being captured would be fairly minimal for the golden-rule solution. (iii)
The assumption of strong convexity (Axiom 6) has been used extensively in
our analysis. Without it, the uniqueness of a maximal path is unlikely to
obtain. But, then, the uniqueness of an optimal path will not hold in general
either.26 Whether maximal paths nevertheless continue to be optimal in the
more general context, where strong convexity is replaced by (weak) convexity,
remains an open question.
Our setting for forest management is best applied to governments man-
aging forest resources of a country. Roughly, two-thirds of the world’s forests
are currently managed by governments, so we feel the model has fairly wide
potential use. Of course, our analysis focuses on the managed forest, under
intergenerational equity. Thus, the social rate of discount is zero, while the
market rate of interest is typically positive. In the same vein, the shadow
prices supporting maximal paths provide the correct social evaluation of
forestry land, according to the vintage of trees standing on it, and are likely
to diﬀer from market prices of forestry land. This disparity arises because
market prices and interest rates are determined by (aggregate) decisions of
individuals whose preferences reﬂect fairly short-run objectives. In the inter-
est of intergenerational equity (of generations yet unborn), governments can
play a vital role in managing forests on a sustainable basis.
Our theory of shadow prices supporting maximal paths shows that judi-
cious forest management involves the methods of social project evaluation,
where the notion of “generalized proﬁt maximization” is still central (as in
private project evaluation), but the proﬁts are evaluated at the appropri-
26In the context of a somewhat diﬀerent dynamic optimization model, this has been
demonstrated in a concrete example by Khan and Mitra (2002).
38ate shadow prices, and using the appropriate social rate of discount, rather
than the corresponding market based magnitudes. In this respect, the con-
siderations which lead a country to preserve its national parks are also the
considerations which lead to forest management which respects intergenera-
tional equity.
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